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Co-benefits1. Introduction
Within documents related to the Doha Climate Change
Conference in November 2012, “grave concern” was noted
as there is still a “significant gap between the aggregate effect
of Parties' mitigation pledges … and aggregate emission
pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the
increase in global average temperature below 2 °C” (UNFCCC,
2012a [27,13]). Fragmentation is a suitable description of
global climate policy action as countries follow their ownpolicy
agendas. On the other hand, a topical case of a region leading
the way by initiating more stringent climate action is the
European Union and the implementation of the “Roadmap for
moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050” (short:
EU Roadmap). Within this Roadmap both immediate mitiga-
tion efforts and large-scale reductions of emissions by 80–95%
below emissions in 1990 have been proposed, refer to
[9]. Alas, pioneering with mitigation efforts in a world ofchwanitz).
uthors. Published by Elsev
0/).fragmented climate policies leads to a question of whether
initiating significant and immediate climate change miti-
gation can support the achievement of other non-climate
objectives. More specifically, we ask whether such co-benefits
exist regardless of how the rest of theworld responds to Europe's
pioneering action.
Using the results from eleven global integrated assessment
models (IAMs), we focus our analysis on potential co-benefits
connectedwith energy security and air pollution.With respect to
energy security, we study the development of import depen-
dence on fossil fuels as well as the impact on Europe's bill for oil
and gas.We also review energy diversity indicators (Section 3.1).
Regarding, the side-effects of climate change mitigation efforts
on air pollution (Section 3.2), we review whether external costs
avoided in the electricity sector are sizable in comparison
to the overall policy cost. In addition, we highlight the
sources of the greatest potential co-benefits which underlie
the sectoral estimates with a focus on eight different energy
sources (including nuclear, a range of renewable energies (RE),
coal, oil, and gas).
To test the robustness of co-benefits across varying mitiga-
tion efforts in a fragmented world, we analyze different climateier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
1 Note that all climate policies have been implemented by means of
equivalent regional taxes on GHG emissions' running auxiliary scenarios.
These taxes represent the shadow price of the quantity instruments.
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to Kriegler et al. of this issue [20]. In particular, we look at
the following subset of scenarios with a focus on the European
Union:
• Fragmentation — RefPol: Countries have their own agenda
and followmore or less stringent climate policies. This scenario
is an extrapolation of unconditional climate policies that are
currently in place based on the Copenhagen Pledges.
• Concerted action — CF450: The world jointly commits to a
450 ppm target with flexibility allowed in the models'
response to the target in terms of the timing of emission
reductions.
• Inspiration — 450P-EU: The European Union pioneers with
more stringent climate policies as foreseen in the EU
Roadmap 2050. Inspired by this early action, the world
makes a transition to a global emission reduction path
consistent with a 450 ppm target.
• Disillusion — RefP-EUback: The European Union pioneers
with its Roadmap 2050 but does not succeed in inspiring
the world to follow, the EU then returns to the less stringent
climate policies of the fragmented world from 2030.
• No policy case — Base: Countries do not follow any climate
policies, and hence, the shadowprice of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions is zero.
Studies related to ours are [4,11,12,18]. Knopf et al. [18] is
a model inter-comparison exercise of the energy modeling
forum, EMF 28, focused on EU 2020 and 2050 climate targets
with a review of different technological futures. Their analysis of
the EU Roadmap strategy suggests that a reduction of GHGs by
80% in 2050 is possible but challenging as strong cost increases
take place from 2040. The authors also conclude that it is
necessary to start the transformation of the energy systembefore
2030. References [11,12] are the official assessments carried out
for the development of the EU Roadmap 2050. Capros et al. [4]
discusses related energy projections of the scenarios used for the
EU Roadmap 2050. Both studies are based on themodel PRIMES.
In this paper we define co-benefits as a positive physical side
effect of one policy (here climate policy) for another public policy
objective (see also [8]). The following papers take up a similar
discussion of climatic co-benefits as we do: in a single-model
study McCollum et al. [23] find co-benefits in an increasing
renewable energy (RE) deployment in terms of energy security
and air pollution. Borenstein [2] discusses potential co-benefits of
RE such as their contributions to alleviating externalities from
fossil fuel burning, energy security improvements, reducing the
vulnerability of energy market prices, and the creation of jobs.
Due to various methodological shortcomings (e.g. the market
value of electricity depends on time and location, the problem
of how to account for variability) the author concludes that
environmental co-benefits may be more important. Similarly,
Edenhofer et al. [7] argue that a possible benefit of RE (as a
decentralized energy option) is that they can play an important
role in improving access to energy in rural areas. A note of
caution should be raised as co-benefits should also be assessed in
a more complex framework, i.e. taking account of competing
public policy objectives, which to the authors' knowledge have
not been completed to this date.
The paper is structured the following way. In Section 2,
we introduce details of the scenario design and briefly review
participatingmodels.We also compareGHGemission reductionsin these scenarios with those defined in the EU Roadmap
2050. In Section 3, we analyze co-benefit candidates as they
were described above. The concluding section summarizes
our findings on possible sources of co-benefits.
2. Europe's early action in a world of fragmented
climate policies
In this sectionwe provide details on the scenario framework
and on participating models. We then study the consequences
for the development of GHG emissions across the different
scenarios. As expected the EU Roadmap 2050 implies more
stringent climate policies in comparison to the unconditional
Copenhagen Pledges which are the basis of the fragmented
regional action scenario.
2.1. Scenario design
The current world with fragmented climate policies is
characterized by diverse levels of ambition with respect to
mitigating climate change. These are expressed in our scenarios
with different targets across the globe for GHG emission caps
and intensities, shares of RE in electricity production or final
energy, and capacity targets for low carbon technologies (wind,
solar, geothermal, and nuclear energy). Apart from these
targets, which are based on a review of current climate policies,
the development of GHG intensity rates from 2020 was
projected reflecting current trends and planned policies.1
More specifically, the scenario ‘Fragmentation’ (short:
RefPol) is an extrapolation of climate policies that are currently
in place based on the unconditional Copenhagen Commitments
and national/regional low carbon technology targets (if these
exist). The European Union has a moderate GHG reduction
target of 15% in 2020with the aimof achieving a 20% share of RE
in final energy by 2020. After 2020, we assume that the GHG
intensity falls at least at 3% p.a. in the EuropeanUnion. Fig. 1 also
provides an overview of emission caps and constraints on the
development of GHG intensities as imposed in other world
regions. Assumptions in these regions concerning technology
targets for RE shares and/or capacities for low carbon technol-
ogies are provided in [20]. Note, that neither emission trading
between regions nor banking and borrowing are allowed.
As opposed to the fragmented climate policy action in
different world regions, we also study scenarios of immediate
‘Concerted action’where theworld aims to stabilize atmospheric
GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2se. These constraints on
GHG emissions are imposed for all sectors, incl. land-use change
(short scenario name: CF450). The full basket of GHGs
includes CO2, CH4 (GWP 25), N2O (GWP 298), and F-gasses.
Note however, that the model IMACLIM reports only CO2
and the model POLES does not report N2O and CH4. To
harmonize targets between models capturing different baskets
of GHGs, models were provided with a cumulative carbon
dioxide budget for the period 2000–2100 (1500 GtCO2 and
2400 GtCO2 for 450 and 550 ppm CO2e targets, respectively).
In scenarios ‘Inspiration’ (short: 450P-EU) and ‘Disillusion’
(short: RefP-EUback) the EU pioneers with more stringent
Fig. 1. Climate policies in the fragmentation scenario (RefPol) include caps for 2020 greenhouse gas emission/intensities for selected regions, targets for
renewable shares, capacity targets for low carbon technologies, and projections of post-2020 greenhouse gas intensity improvement rates (see legend).
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targeting in GHGs a reduction of 20% in 2020 and 80% in 2050,
with respect to 1990 levels. Note that land-use, land-use change
and forestry sectors have been included in our study whereas
they are not in the EU Roadmap. Regional carbon trajectories
following from this design are used as an input for the period
2011–2030 in 450P-EU and RefP-EUback. Therefore, decisions
under both scenarios are identical until 2030. From 2030 both
scenarios, however, depart. In 450P-EU, inspired by the early
action of the EU, the world makes a transition to a global
450 ppm path from 2030 onward. This is implemented in the
models by a linear transformation of regional carbon taxes
obtained in 2030 to carbon prices that are consistent with a
global 450 ppm trajectory in 2050 (note that technology targets
are included). Utilizing this scenario designmeans that foresight
models can implement the scenario in a way where there is
no anticipation of the transition to a concerted action. In the
RefP-EUback scenario, the EU pioneering with its Roadmap
2050 does not succeed in inspiring the world to follow. The EU
then returns to the less stringent climate policies of the RefPol
from 2030. This is implemented by relaxing the EU carbon price
to the carbon price of RefPol over the period 2030–2050. Again,
the foresight models can implement the scenarios so that
foreseeing the fallback of carbon prices is not possible.
Finally, we include a ‘no policy case’ in our scenario
framework (short: Base). In this scenario, countries do not
follow any climate policies, and hence, the shadow price of
GHG emissions is zero. This acts as a baseline when reviewing
co-benefits in Section 3.1 and calculating policy costs as well as
external costs avoided within Section 3.2.
2.2. Overview on participating models
The scenario framework has been implemented by eleven
global IAMs: four inter-temporal general equilibrium models
(MESSAGE, MERGE-ETL, REMIND, and WITCH), three compu-
tational general equilibrium models (GEM-E3, IMACLIM, and
WorldScan), and four partial equilibrium models (DNE21+,
IMAGE, GCAM, and POLES). Differences across themodels w.r.t.
their economic coverage, assumptions on technologies and
technical change aswell as trade are provided in the Appendix,Table 5. A discussion of these differences is taken up in the
following analysis. Models also differ in their regional resolu-
tion. The mapping of native model regions to the 27 EU
member states is not exact for the following models: GCAM
additionally includes EFTA and Turkey, while for IMACLIM
andMESSAGE they are EFTA, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia.
IMAGE as well as MERGE-ETL additionally includes EFTA and
former Yugoslavia. DNE21+ does not include the Baltic States.
These differences should be kept inmind throughout the paper.
Furthermore, as part of the AMPERE study, all models have
harmonized their long-term population and GDP trajectories.
Input for all models is based on the medium-fertility variant
of the UN World Population Prospects Revision 2010 [29].
Regarding the development of economic growth, a medium
growth scenario has been computed for GDP utilizing the
method developed in [21] and also documented in [19]. In this
scenario, technology leaders are assumed to grow at a medium
rate and countries catch-up to their level of development at a
medium speed of convergence. The assumptions on economic
and population growth translate to a global GDP growth
of about 3.5% in the period 2005–2050. It slows down at the
EU-27 level from 1.7% growth to 1.5% by 2100. Scenario
assumptions for the development in the EU are comparable to
projections used by the European Commission.
Note that throughout Sections 2.3 to 3.1 we define that a
cross-model result x is robust if
x ¼ Q3−Q1
Q2
; with
xb0:2 robust;
0:2bxb0:3 lessrobust;
0:3bx mixed;
8<
:
where Q3 is the upper quartile, Q1 is the lower quartile, and Q2 is
the median. The ratio is also known as the robust coefficient of
variation. Our choice in the definition of ‘robust’, ‘less robust’, and
‘mixed’ is somewhat arbitrary. It is, however, motivated by the
numerical values obtained for harmonized population and GDP
developments. Note that despite the harmonization, we see
some variations across the models in these variables (0.07–0.12
and 0.03–0.07, respectively). This is caused by small differences
in implementing the population and GDP growth scenarios
(e.g. conversion of purchasing power parities to monetary
Table 1
Comparing EU Roadmap targets (rel. to 1990) with the median of emissions
in % across scenarios and models (coefficient of variation in brackets;
land-use, land-use change and forestry sectors are included) in the EU.
IMACLIM and POLES are not included for GHG and Non-CO2 results as these
models do not comprise the full basket of Kyoto gasses. Abbreviation: FF&I
refers to fossil fuels and industryrefers to fossil fuels and industry.
Reduction Scenario 2030 2040 2050 2100
GHG Roadmap 40–44% 60% 79–82% N/A
RefPol 24 (0.30) 34 (0.21) 44 (0.16) 72 (0.04)
450P-EU 34 (0.18) 51 (0.19) 67 (0.35) 96 (0.14)
RefP-EUback 34 (0.21) 41 (0.17) 48 (0.18) 74 (0.10)
Non-CO2 Roadmap 72–73% N/A 70–78% N/A
RefPol 32 (0.82) 39 (0.61) 41 (0.60) 44 (0.90)
450P-EU 38 (0.49) 45 (0.30) 49 (0.15) 59 (0.39)
RefP-EUback 38 (0.49) 40 (0.59) 40 (0.61) 47 (0.88)
FF&I CO2 Roadmap,
Power
54–68% N/A 93–99% N/A
Roadmap,
Industry
34–40% N/A 83–87% N/A
RefPol 24 (0.34) 37 (0.20) 45 (0.18) 80 (0.12)
450P-EU 38 (0.21) 57 (0.37) 73 (0.26) 107 (0.12)
RefP-EUback 38 (0.23) 45 (0.13) 51 (0.14) 82 (0.07)
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to the region that results in the best mapping to EU27. Thus,
due to this inevitable spread, we define 0.2 as the threshold
for robustness.
2.3. Emission reductions compared to EU Roadmap 2050
Having defined the scenarios, we first compare the RefPol
and 450P-EU scenarios to themore common450 ppm scenario
at both, the global and EU levels. Across all models, RefPol
shows higher GHG emissions at the global level in comparison
to CF450. Regarding 450P-EU, one model (IMACLIM) did not
find a feasible solution. For the other models 450P-EU is close
to a 450 ppm path at a global level. In the case of Europe most
models have GHG emissions in RefPol below Europe's path that
would be consistent with a global 550 ppm regime in the first
half of this century but above the 450P-EU and 450 ppm paths
(CF-450). Therefore, we relate RefPol with ‘moderate action’
and 450P-EU with ‘stringent action’ (which is also the case for
RefP-EUback for the period 2011–2030).
Next we turn to the question of how GHG reductions in
IAMs compare to the EU Roadmap targets. According to this
policy study, cost-effective milestones along this path are the
achievement of GHG reductions by about 40% and 60% below
1990 levels by 2030 and 2040, respectively.2 Note again,
that we include emissions from land-use, land-use change and
forestry. For the comparison, we take 1990 emission levels
from theUNFCCC reporting (taking account for the definition of
Europe in each model) [28].,
Roadmap targets (incl. indicative sectoral reductions) and
model means (incl. coefficient of variation in brackets) are
shown in Table 1. The reduction of GHG emissions tend to be
robust or less robust across all scenarios. At the lower range are
GCAM and MESSAGE. Results are far less robust for non-CO2
emissions. This is due to larger uncertainties connected with
non-CO2 data and due to different model strategies to comply
with targets which are imposed on the full GHG basket. For
example, WITCH reduces Non-CO2 in 2050 by 63% whereas
GCAM shows a reduction of only 8% (450P-EU). CO2-reductions
realized for fossil fuels & industries (FF&I) show a smaller
spread ranging from less robust to robust. Though, not shown
in Table 1, data for 450P-EU and CF-450 are very close to each
other. These scenarios are – as expected – those closest to the
EU Roadmap targets. A reason for this lies in the scenario
design in that from 2030 onward models follow a 450 ppm
path. This means that models do not necessarily meet later
reduction targets as long as they do not overshoot the
carbon budget. In case Europe rolls back its Roadmap in
2030 (RefP-EUback), we find that emission levels are almost
back to those in the RefPol by 2050.
3. Identifying co-beneﬁts
In this sectionwe take a closer look at potential co-benefits of
climate changemitigation andwe focus on those connectedwith
energy security (Section 3.1) and air pollution (Section 3.2). We2 Note, Knopf et al. [18] ﬁnd that the 20% reduction target in 2020 is not
consistent with the cost-effective milestones set in the EU Roadmap. General
conclusions made in the EU Roadmap and related documents are, however,
supported by their study.define co-benefits as a positive physical side effect of one policy
(here climate policy) for another public policy objective (see
also [8]). Note that, Borenstein [2] and others are skeptical
about the possibility to calculate such co-benefits as there are
large uncertainties connected with the methods to compare
costs (e.g. how to separate between private and public benefits
or how to monetarize environmental externalities). Edenhofer
et al. [7] add that as policies typically targetmultiple objectives,
an assessment of co-benefits would need to account for this.
They argue that additional welfare effects of co-benefits can
conceptually only occur when these other objectives have not
been addressed by appropriate policy instruments. In addition
to the difficulty around cost calculation methods, there are
also large uncertainties connected with our knowledge about
the fundamental processes that govern the complex human–
environment system in its past, present, and future. These
uncertainties translate into different modeling approaches,
input assumptions, and choices in the level of details.
Given these large methodological and model uncertainties,
we keep our analysis at the level of a qualitative discussion
with regard to energy security and trade expenditures. In the
case of external costs avoided, we provide rough estimations
comparing the costs and benefits of and from EU's pioneering
action.
3.1. Improving energy security and reducing trade expenditures
With respect to energy security, a region benefits when its
self-sufficiency ratio in supplying energies can be increased
or when the resilience of the energy system against uncertain
risks can be improved, as for example achieved by diversifying
energy sources, refer to [1,5] for a detailed review. Upon
exploring pathways for a sustainable energy transition, Riahi
et al. [25] find that energy efficiency and RE have the potential
to double the share of domestic energy supply. Borenstein [2]
and Edenhofer et al. [7] however point out that the contribution
of RE to energy security is likely to be small once the variability
of RE is taken into account. According to the authors, advantages
of higher RE shares tend to be associated with environmental
Table 2
Trends of energy diversity indicators. Abbr.: PE — primary energy. Numbers
in brackets give the coefficient of variation across models.
Index for Europe Scenario 2005 2030 2050
Diversity of
PE supply
Base 1.43 (0.03) 1.43 (0.09) 1.52 (0.19)
RefPol 1.43 (0.03) 1.64 (0.08) 1.72 (0.11)
450P-EU 1.44 (0.02) 1.69 (0.10) 1.72 (0.12)
RefP-EUback 1.43 (0.03) 1.67 (0.09) 1.71 (0.10)
CF-450 1.43 (0.03) 1.54 (0.14) 1.72 (0.16)
Diversity
of electricity
Base 1.54 (0.08) 1.55 (0.24) 1.56 (0.38)
RefPol 1.54 (0.08) 1.79 (0.12) 1.73 (0.27)
450P-EU 1.54 (0.05) 1.83 (0.10) 1.74 (0.16)
RefP-EUback 1.54 (0.08) 1.82 (0.12) 1.73 (0.30)
CF-450 1.54 (0.08) 1.70 (0.12) 1.73 (0.07)
Compound index Base 1.26 (0.06) 1.22 (0.16) 1.36 (0.23)
RefPol 1.26 (0.06) 1.45 (0.14) 1.60 (0.21)
450P-EU 1.27 (0.02) 1.53 (0.17) 1.64 (0.18)
RefP-EUback 1.27 (0.06) 1.51 (0.16) 1.63 (0.18)
CF-450 1.26 (0.06) 1.41 (0.22) 1.61 (0.22)
Table 3
Indicator on import dependency of Europe on fossil resources (coal, gas,
and oil). Numbers in brackets give the coefficient of variation across models.
Scenario 2010 2030 2050
Base 48% (0.15) 49% (0.24) 46% (0.36)
RefPol 49% (0.19) 50% (0.41) 38% (0.88)
450P-EU 48% (0.13) 45% (0.30) 25% (1.17)
RefP-EUback 48% (0.12) 43% (0.33) 29% (1.17)
CF-450 48% (0.13) 47% (0.42) 33% (0.73)
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rather than energy security.
For our analysis, we follow Riahi et al. [25]. and McCollum
et al. [23] who calculate a compound energy security indicator
applicable to the IAMs participating in our study. It accounts
for a region's self-sufficiency in energy supply as well as for its
resilience strength. The former is represented by the share of
traded energy at the primary level,whereas the lattermeasures
the diversity of energy supply (at primary level and for
electricity generation) based on the Shannon–Wiener index.
While our choice of this indicator is motivated by a desire for
the analysis to not become too complicated and is dependent
on the coverage of all possibilities to, e.g., generate electricity,
the compound energy security indicator offers an opportunity
to produce results comparable to the literature. There are other
energy security indicators and for a review of their pros and
cons refer to [1,5,21].
The portfolio of possible supply resources we account for at
the primary energy level includes biomass, coal, gas, geothermal,
hydro, nuclear, ocean, oil, solar, and wind. Potential sources for
generating electricity are biomass, coal, gas, geothermal, hydro,
nuclear, ocean, oil, solar, andwind.We use the samedefinition of
the indicator, DI, and its compound, CDI, as in [16] and calculate
DI ¼−
X
i
pi  ln pið Þð Þ;CDI ¼−
X
i
1−mið Þ  pi ln pið Þð Þ;
with pi as the share of primary energy (PE) type (or the share of a
power generation technology) i in total supply, and mi as the
share of PE resource i supplied by net imports. The classification
of CDI is the same as for DI. Note that decarbonization can also
decrease the indices.
Table 2 shows the index for the diversity of PE supply and
electricity generation across different scenarios as model
means (with the coefficient of variance given in brackets).
Across all scenarios with climate policies, the diversity of PE
supply increases by 2030. Differences between these scenarios
are small as they are almost independent of early action,
concerted action, or levels of stringency. For the no policy
baseline, however, comparatively high values are only reached
at the end of the century, which makes the diversification of
primary energy a co-benefit of climate change mitigation. Note
that the findings are robust for all models and scenarios.
The diversity indicator of electricity supply is already
above 1.5 for all scenarios from 2005 onward, although the
coefficient of variation increases in some scenarios and leads
to less robust findings. The development of the compound
index, which also incorporates import dependencies, is again
robust for all models and scenarios (this is of course also due to
the high aggregation level of the index which blurs differences
in model strategies). For scenarios fostering climate policies,
the category tends to reach around 1.5 already by 2030. This is
only achieved in the no policy base by 2100. This suggests a
co-benefit exists with respect to energy security in general, as
it can be enhanced relative to Base in climate policy scenarios
regardless of the level of stringency or its timing.
In the following we examine the development of import
dependency on fossil resources (coal, gas, and oil) since
co-benefits are connected with lower or less vulnerable trade
expenditures for importing fossil fuels in case of increasing
or instable price developments at global fossil fuel markets.Table 3 presents an import dependency indicator that calcu-
lates the share of fossil energy resources traded at the primary
energy level. This indicator has also been used in [16]. We find
that by 2050 Europe's import dependency could be reduced
below today's level in scenarios with climate policies, although
the spread across models is large. Note that the indicator
only increases until 2030 in Base and RefPol. Note that trends
are consistent with results found in [12], where in 2050
decarbonization scenarios range between 35 and 45% com-
pared to 58% for both, the reference and current policies
scenarios. As in our scenarios, the import dependency is
affected only in later decades, driven by installed capacities of
RE and a decline in domestic consumption. While these trends
differ across the decarbonization scenarios in [12], resulting
indicators show a spread of 10%.
The large spread in the indicator across models in this
study is due to different strategies across models regarding
decarbonization options and due to differences in a model's
input assumptions. For example, DNE21+ builds its emission
reduction strategy on strongly reducing CO2 emissions from
the residential and commercial sectors and by completely
capturing carbon dioxide emissions of electricity supply,
which is most pronounced in 450P-EU. Also, DNE21+ is a
model with a high variety of energy supply technologies and
CCS plays a large role as well as the transition to a hydrogen
based society. On the other hand, the highest shares of RE in
primary energy are seen in 450P-EU for the models IMAGE,
MERGE-ETL, and REMIND ranging from 43 to 53% by 2050.
Only these models in the corresponding scenario are in the
range of RE shares seen in decarbonization scenarios within
the EU Roadmap [12], i.e. 41–59% by 2050. A reason for a high
20601980 2000 2020 2040 2080 2100
0,01
0,1
1
f/(
1-f
)
Coal
Gas
Oil
5% market share
33% market share
Fig. 2. Fisher–Pry plot (upper panel).
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low-cost option (measured by levelized cost of electricity —
LCOE). A second pillar in the RE mix of IMAGE is biomass in
combination with CCS.
In all models, the import of oil is being reduced strongly
in upcoming decades across all climate policy scenarios.
Compared to 2010, oil imports in 2050 decrease between 46%
(0.71) and 54% (0.54) in climate policy scenarios and 29%
(0.51) in the Base. Since oil prices are increasing during the
same time (most pronounced in climate policy scenarios), this
is combined with a lower bill for oil. The reduction potential
compared to the Base in 2050 is up to 40–50% (with mixed
robustness). How coal and gas bills are affected is even more
diverse across models since models opt for different roles
of coal and gas in future markets. For example, some models
see a renaissance of coal possible as CCS technologies mature.
Others, see gas to take a bridging role before renewable
energies have the lion's share in the markets. This is also
underlined in Figs. 2–4 showing the market ratio of fossil
primary energy carriers f (as f/(1 − f)) over time in a semi-
logarithmic plot (Fisher–Pry graph) for 450P-EU, RefP-EUback,
and RefPol (upper panel, middle panel, and lower panel, resp.).
Historical data are also included and shown as crosses.3 Lines
show the development of model means, the range of models
is indicated for 2030 and 2050 using standard box plots.4
Furthermore, the two black lines indicate market shares of 5%
and 33%.
Concluding, the analysis in this section leads to the
identification of co-benefits connected with energy security
and trade expenditures. However, the spread across models
is large as multiple pathways are available to decarbonize
the energy system — especially with regard to CCS linked to
gas and/or coal.3 Note, smaller deviation in 2005 from historical and model data are due
to different regional deﬁnitions and differences in accounting methods.
4 To avoid overlapping boxes, they are not exactly located at 2030 and
2050.3.2. External costs avoided within the electricity sector
Ever since the ExternE project was commissioned by
the European Commission in 1995, cross-benefits of major
policies have increasingly been reviewed. While doubts may
persist in the validity of externality estimates, especially in
terms of climate change damages, other key metrics such
as health related damage costs from air pollution have been
acknowledged to give a good approximation of the order of
magnitude of the associated external cost [18]. This consider-
ation is an important one as external costs in terms ofmonetary
valuations tend to be heavily driven by respiratory effects. The
EXIOPOL project estimated that for the EU in 2000 67.2% of
the total external cost was attributed to air pollution and that
this is consistent with a 369 billion Euro valuation [26]. With
a heavy focus on the EU, EXIOPOL assessed the damages from
the emissions of pollutants and applied these estimates to an
evaluation of EUDirective 2009/28/EC, [10], which focuses on a
20% share of RE in gross energy consumption and a 10% share of
biofuels within transport. Focusing on GHGs, airborne pollut-
ants, particulatematter and sulfur dioxide, the EXIOPOL project
estimates that a decrease in CO2 emissions of almost 150 Mt in
2020 leads to 11.6 billion Euros of benefits for the EU-27 [14].
Utilizing external cost estimates for electricity generation in
2020 sourced from the CASES (Cost Assessment of Sustainable
Energy Systems) project, [3], we conduct a similar calculation
for a range of models and a range of climate policies. Using
estimates for the external cost of electricity generation for a
range of energy types and a range of factors, such as human
health, loss of biodiversity, and other various impacts from
non-CO2 gasses (including nitrogen oxides, particulates, and
sulfur dioxide), we compare the implied external cost to the
range of policy costs sourced from the models participating
in the AMPERE project. Table 4 reviews the range of external
cost estimates sourced from CASES that will be applied to the
changes in electricity produced within the model results. For
oil, solar PV, hydro, and biomass we have utilized an average
of a range of specific technologies types providedwithin CASES
to couple these with the broader categories reported by the
20601980 2000 2020 2040 2080 2100
0,01
0,1
1
f/(
1-f
)
Coal
Gas
Oil
5% market share
33% market share
Fig. 3. Fisher–Pry plot (middle panel).
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some uncertainty into the analysis, the discussion surrounding
Fig. 6 will address the impact of the most notable source of
potential bias this being differences in the source of biomass
used for electricity production. CASES provides external
cost estimates for both biomass from straw and biomass
from woodchips with a differential in the external cost
estimates of almost 3:1. Within this analysis, we have
applied the average of these two costs and hence assume a
50–50 split between straw and woodchip based biomass.
Fig. 6 shows the potential improvement if only woodchip
based biomass were to be utilized, however it should be
acknowledged that even with this allowance made the
external cost associated with woodchip based biomass
electricity production remains higher than that of gas
without CCS.1980 2000 2020
0,01
0,1
1
f/(
1-f
)
Coal
Gas
Oil
Fig. 4. Fisher–Pry plot (lower panel) showing the development of market shares f f
450P-EU, the middle panel RefP-EUback, and the lower panel shows RefPol. HistoriConsistent with larger emission decreases and higher RE
shares than in EU Directive 2009/28/EC and reviewed in
the EXIOPOL project, Fig. 5 reviews the issue of whether there
are co-benefits of following a range of climate policies. Fig. 5
shows that in 2020 the external costs avoided from electricity
generation that can be associated with following different
climate policies rival the total cost of following that policy.
Shading within Figs. 5 and 6 represent the area between
the 25th and 75th percentiles and highlight the clustering of
individual model observations (marked as white rectangles).
It should be noted that these estimates for external costs
avoided are only for electricity production and are likely to
increase as other sectors are added to these numbers. It is
important to note that external costs are calculated using
the CASE estimates (Euro cents per kWh) for each fuel type
and the levels of energy in each scenario separately. These20602040 2080 2100
5% market share
33% market share
or fossil energy technologies at primary energy level. The upper panel shows
cal data are indicated by crosses, source of data: ENERDATA.
Table 4
External costs of energy produced by impact category (2005 Euro cents per
kWh). Abbr.: SO2 — sulfur dioxide, NOx — nitrogen oxides.
Nuclear Oil Gas Coal
wo CCS wo CCS
Human health 0.090 2.035 0.519 0.855
Loss of biodiversity 0.006 0.133 0.060 0.078
Crop N deposition
& crops O3
0.001 0.028 0.016 0.017
Crops SO2 −0.0001 −0.0016 −0.0002 −0.0005
Materials: SO2 & NOx 0.001 0.040 0.007 0.014
Other pollutants
— h. health
0.020 0.050 0.023 0.055
Radionuclides generic 0.0020 0.0002 ≈0 0.0001
Wind Solar PV Hydro Biomass
Human health 0.041 0.546 0.050 0.981
Loss of biodiversity 0.003 0.030 0.002 0.202
Crop N deposition
& crops O3
0.001 0.006 0.001 0.016
Crops SO2 ≈0 −0.0003 ≈0 −0.0003
Materials: SO2 & NOx ≈0 0.008 ≈0 0.009
Other pollutants
— h. health
0.014 0.086 0.003 0.161
Radionuclides generic ≈0 0.0003 ≈0 0.0003
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scenario, resulting in external costs avoided. While some of
these externalities may be accounted for in reality through
non-climate based policymaking and regulations, IAMs usually
start from a no policy baseline and this is how we approach
this analysis with respect to the differences between the Base
and the climate policy scenarios.
Note that the mitigation/policy costs included in Fig. 5 are
not fully comparable; however they nevertheless show that
the external costs avoided fromelectricity alone tend to rival the
aggregate cost of the climate policies reviewed. Mitigation costs
from the general equilibrium models (Table 5) are given in
terms of GDP losses (GEM-E3, MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE, REMIND,
WITCH, and WorldScan). The mitigation costs for the partial
equilibrium models are given in terms of the dead-weight
loss area under the MAC curve (GCAM, IMAGE, and POLES) or
in terms of additional energy system costs (DNE21+). WITCH
has also reported the additional energy system cost and these
estimates are included in Fig. 5. Upon reviewing these results,100
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Fig. 5. External costs avoided from changes to electricity production in 202the differences between these mitigation cost concepts need to
be kept in mind. Nevertheless, Fig. 5 includes lines which link
the estimates of external costs avoided with the policy costs
in terms of GDP loss for the five models which utilize the GDP
loss policy cost metric. Of the five models, three show policy
cost levels which are already below the estimates of external
costs avoided for the electricity sector when the CASES generic
climate change costs are accounted for in the RefPol and 450P-
EU scenarios. Twomodels (MESSAGE and REMIND) showhigher
policy costs of approximately 15 billion Euros and 50 billion
Euros, respectively, for the RefPol scenario. In the case of the
450P-EU scenario this differential is approximately 12 billion
Euros and 43 billion Euros for these same models.
Irrespective of these differentials, the overall amount
of emission reductions in comparison to the Base scenarios,
the amount of emission reductions in other sectors, and the
associated benefits of these reductions from these additional
sectors are all issues which need to be considered. In the case
of the CF450 scenario, all five models show benefits from
following the policy based on external costs avoided in the
electricity sector alone. As there is uncertainty concerning
the cost of climate change damages, Fig. 5 shows external
costs avoided with and without climate impacts. Introducing
these climate change related costs inflate the estimates
differently across the models, however four of the five models
which report GDP loss based policy cost show relatively stable
increases.
All of the models have a notable share of RE within Base
and while the energy mixes to meet the different policies do
differ, the one constant is that decarbonization in all models
is associated with the decrease of coal without CCS technol-
ogies within electricity. A common trend across most models
is the immediate decrease in the use of traditional coal-fired
power stations, unless notable and rapid land-use changes
are possible. Global concerted effort that coincides with the
cost-effective solution for eachmodel (CF-450) results in lower
policy costs within the EU and less aggressive reductions
than those shown in the policies where the EU pioneers with
immediate action. Fig. 5 shows that the gain of co-benefits
through external costs avoided is possible, even upon reviewing
the reduction of externalities from electricity alone, with and
without the impact of climate damages. Additional external
costs avoided should be added to these estimates to accounty Cost -
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Fig. 6. External costs avoided from changes to electricity production in 2020 calculated using Base scenario (billions 2005 Euros).
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within the EXIOPOL project a 10% biofuel share consistent with
meeting EU Directive 2009/28/EC and achieving an 8% decrease
in total emissions was attributed to a benefit of 4 billion Euros
[14]. The issue of energy security and RE energy has also been
reviewed with respect to co-benefits in Section 3.2; [7,15,22]
should also be considered in addition to the analysis within
this section.
Fig. 6 presents the range of external costs avoided across
technology types (without climate impacts). Reducing tradition-
al coal-fired power plants provides the greatest co-benefit due
to the amount of external costs associated with this technology.
Note that coalwithout CCShas the third highest external cost per
kWh as denoted by the height of the diamonds in Fig. 6 and
across the categories in Table 4. The cost of coal without CCS is
lower than the external cost for oil and mixed biomass in terms
of Euro cents per kWh, upon using the assumed 50–50 split
between straw and woodchip based biomass. The benefits of a
greater share of non-biomass RE than in the no policy scenario
Base assist decarbonization aimed at meeting the climate policy
targetwithout a significant increase in external costs. The impact
of biomass is an important issue as the CASES estimates show
that the source of the biomass will have a notable impact upon
the external costs estimates. Uncertainties concerning the impact
of biomass are present within this analysis due to the likelihood
of different mixes of biomass sources in each model and/or
scenario. The potential impact of this is shownwithin Fig. 6 with
the external costs defined for woodchip based biomass alone
being almost half of that associatedwith themixed biomass case.
Human health and biodiversity loss are where noticeable
differences in the costs between straw and wood chip based
biomass occur.
Indeed, the source of biomass is important within IAM
studies aswhile providing notable emission reduction potential,
these models also may not fully capture the negative external-
ities of this fuel source. Creutzig et al. [6] note that while IAMs
tend to notably rely upon bio-energy, life-cycle emissions of
these fuel sources are highly uncertain overall and IAMs tend
to insufficiently account for induced land-use changes. Upondirectly incorporating external cost estimates into the MARKAL
model, Rafaj andKypreos [24] found large reductions in coal use
which were heightened when both local and global external-
ities were accounted for. While Klaassen and Riahi [17] found
that accounting for externalities within the MESSAGE-MACRO
model resulted in little reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
(due to carbon leakage), significant decreases in sulfur emissions
did occur irrespective of the existence of DESOX technologies
within their baseline. With co-benefits acknowledged, Klaassen
and Riahi [17] conclude with the acknowledgment that damage
costs for SO2 and NOx are underestimated due to the exemption
of damages to sensitive ecosystems and historical buildings,
as well as the valuation of mortality impacts. These limitations
are also valid for the external cost estimates utilized within this
paper.
To conclude the discussion, we now focus on a compar-
ison of the external costs avoided in comparison to the CF450
scenario using the RefPol and 450P-EU scenarios. In doing
so, we are able to review how these interim policy measures
differ in comparison to a fully flexible global climate policy. The
majority of observations in Fig. 7 show the expected relation-
ship between higher abatement/emissions and higher external
costs avoided/suffered. With respect to external costs avoided
in comparison to CF450, the MERGE model stands out with
similar emission reductions and less external costs avoided in
comparison to other models due to either more coal w/o CCS
and/or biomass prevailing in these MERGE results. Four models
(DNE21, GEM-E3, MESSAGE, and REMIND) cluster together
with a range of relative abatement of 10–15%more CO2 emission
reductions compared to the 1990 level. GCAM has strong CO2
emission reductions in both RefPol and 450P-EU as the model
has a relatively low decrease in energy demand with respect to
othermodels, while IMACLIM also does strong CO2 abatement in
the RefPol scenario. Two models (WITCH and WorldScan) have
fewer emission abatement in the 450P-EU scenario with respect
to the CF450 scenario which reflect how much abatement is
conducted outside the EU or in other GHGs.
Across the scenarios reviewed (RefPol and 450P-EU),
the consideration of external costs from the electricity sector
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Fig. 7. External costs avoided and CO2 emission reductions in comparison to CF450 scenario.
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include the reduction of coal without CCS and the promotion
of non-biomass RE. It is acknowledged that a definitive choice
between the policy scenarios within this analysis would need
a broader range of benefits and a more direct comparison to
the costs of these policies. As such, these results on external
costs avoided should be treated as being indicative of the
potential co-benefits of climate policies (with sizable external
costs avoided related to the electricity sector), while identify-
ing reduced coal and increased RE as reasonable co-benefits
related to a range of targets for CO2 abatement — subject to
caveats, such as caution based on the source of biomass.
4. Conclusions
Within this paper, we study co-benefits of climate change
mitigation for the EU across eleven different IAMs and a
range of decarbonization scenarios. We review non-climate
synergies related to energy security and lower trade expendi-
tures. In addition, we analyze external costs avoided in the
electricity sector and identify those technologies with the
greatest potential benefit in terms of externalities reduced.
Our assessment yields the following results:
• Improving energy security and reducing trade expenditures:
We find a tendency for the oil bill to be lower under climate
policies and a reduction of import dependencies on fossil
resources. But results show a large spread across models
since decarbonization pathways vary. At the same time
the diversity of PE supply improves in all climate policy
scenarios across the models and it has been identified asbeing robust. Thus, the diversity of energy supply consti-
tutes a co-benefit. Models are, however, mixed regarding
the relative flexibility in the electricity sector.
• External costs avoided within the electricity sector: We find
that in 2020 the co-benefit of decarbonizing the electricity
sector tends to result in potential benefits which rival the
total cost of the policy. These benefits are related to the
reduction of coal without CCS in favor of non-biomass RE.
An important issue to consider w.r.t. externalities is the
source of biomass, which can lead to notably different
estimates of external costs avoided. For example, in this
analysis we have looked at costs associated with wood
basedbiomass in comparison to amixed sourcewhich includes
50% straw. However, IAMs will likely have different sources
utilized across models and/or scenarios. Note that we have
been conservative in applying themixed sources external costs
estimates within the sectoral calculations.
As a general result we furthermore find that the spread across
models is larger than across climate policy scenarios, suggesting
that amulti-model analysis is necessary to identify robust results
given the large uncertainties surrounding climate change causes
and impacts. In light of this, the analysis has focused upon iden-
tifying results which are robust and consistent across models.
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Appendix A
Table 5
Overview on model characteristics. Abbr.: agri— agriculture, aggr. — aggregated, LU— land-use, regional mapping: + if a native model region is larger than EU27
and − if smaller, U uranium, C coal, O oil, G gas, TC — technological change, exTC exogenous TC, enTC endogenous TC, AEEI autonomous energy efficiency
improvements, agro — agro-products, elec — electricity, o — other.
Model Economic coverage Regional resolution Technology and TC Trade
DNE21+ energy 19 regions, EU27− exTC C, O, G, LNG, bio fuel, elec
GCAM economy, energy, LU 14 regions, EU27+ exTC C, O, G, U, agro
GEM-E3 economy, energy, agri 9 regions, EU27 exTC agro, C, O, G, power, o. goods
IMACLIM economy, energy, agri 12 regions, EU27+ enTC, LBD all sector products
IMAGE energy, agri 26 regions, EU27+
MERGE-ETL aggr. economy, energy 8 regions, EU27+ exTC, LBD C, O, G, U, biomass, capital & energy-intensive good
MESSAGE aggr. economy, energy, LU 11 regions, EU27+ exogenous for energy C, O, G, U, LNG, elec, other energy
POLES economy, energy, agri 21 regions, EU27 exTC, enTC C, O, G, U, biomass
REMIND aggr. economy, energy 11 regions, EU27 C, O, G, U, capital good
WITCH aggr. economy, energy 13 regions, EU27 exTC, enTC C, O, G
WorldScan aggr., energy, economy 5 regions, EU27 exTC C, G, O
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